Case: People v. Martinez - 4DCA reverses superior court’s order that had dismissed criminal case based on purported speedy-trial violation
Decided: 2/7/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a purported violation of the defendant’s speedy-trial rights
Plaintiff-appellant: The People of the State of California
Defendant-respondent: Richard Martinez
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two case no.: E082657
Appeal from: Riverside Superior Court (Elias, J., of the San Diego Superior Court)
Advocates: Michael Hestrin and Kristen Allison for the People; Andrea Bitar for Martinez
Question:
(1) In January 2018, the People charged the defendant with one felony count of grand theft and three misdemeanors. The superior court arraigned the defendant on the complaint in December 2021. The superior court held the preliminary hearing in February 2023 and held the defendant to answer. The People promptly filed an information charging the defendant with the same offenses in the complaint. In September 2023, the defendant filed a “motion to dismiss based on pre-filing delay resulting in prejudice.” The defendant claimed that key witnesses were now unavailable. The defendant did not indicate which witnesses were permanently unavailable or the relevance of their testimony. The defendant also admitted that there was a possibility the witnesses could be found. The superior court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Did the superior court err in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss by not requiring the defendant to demonstrate prejudice?
Answer:
(1) The superior court erred in dismissing the defendant’s felony charge and needed to conduct the requisite federal speedy-trial analysis for the misdemeanor charges.
The speedy-trial analysis differs between federal and California law.
The federal speedy-trial right in felony cases attaches upon either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge. The filing of a felony complaint does not trigger federal speedy-trial protection. The defendant’s felony federal speedy-trial rights were not violated.
The federal speedy-trial right in misdemeanor cases attaches upon the filing of the complaint. The superior court must balance (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant in assessing whether a misdemeanor federal speedy-trial violation has occurred. A more-than-one-year delay in misdemeanor cases is presumptively prejudicial. The 46-month delay in this case was presumptively prejudicial. But the superior court did not conduct the requisite four-factor speedy-trial analysis, so remand was necessary for the superior court to reconsider.
The state speedy-trial right in felony cases is triggered by the filing of a felony complaint. But the defendant must show actual prejudice. The defendant’s assertions of prejudice were conclusionary and speculative. The defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. The defendant’s felony state speedy-trial rights were not violated.
The state speedy-trial right in misdemeanor cases attaches upon the defendant’s arrest or the filing of the misdemeanor complaint, whichever is first. The defendant must show actual prejudice. The defendant, again, failed to demonstrate actual prejudice.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two reversed the superior court’s order dismissing the case. The Fourth District Court of Appeal directed the superior court to enter an order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to the felony charge. For the misdemeanor charges, the Court directed the superior court to enter an order denying the defendant’s motion with respect to the defendant’s state constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court remanded for the superior court to determine whether the defendant’s misdemeanor federal speedy-trial rights were violated.
Justice McKinster authored the opinion, joined by Justices Miller and Fields.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 429628