Case: People v. Superior Court (Valdez) - 4DCA denies resentencing relief to defendant who was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence he received at Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) resentencing
Decided: 2/10/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Petition for writ of mandate from the superior court’s order granting a Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) petition for resentencing
Petitioner: The People of the State of California
Respondent: The Superior Court of Riverside County
Real Party in Interest: Mariano Valdez
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two case no.: E084222
Petition from an order by: Riverside Superior Court (Molloy, J.)
Advocates: Michael Hestrin and W. Matthew Murray for the People; Steven Harmon, William Meronek, and Nicholas Kross for Valdez
Question:
(1) Under Penal Code § 1170(d)(1), a defendant who (i) was under 18 years old when he committed his offense, (ii) was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), and (iii) has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, may petition the sentencing court for the recall of his sentence and resentencing.
Under Penal Code § 1170(d)(10), if the defendant is resentenced to LWOP, “the defendant may submit another petition for recall and resentencing to the sentencing court when the defendant has been committed to the custody of the department for at least 20 years.”
In People v. Heard, 83 Cal. App. 5th 608, 632 (2022), the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One found that there was “no legitimate reason for making juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit life without parole terms eligible to seek resentencing but not juvenile offenders sentenced to the equivalent of a life without parole sentence.” The Heard Court held that denying a juvenile offender the opportunity to seek resentencing—when that offender was sentenced to 23 years plus 80 years to life, the functional equivalent of LWOP—violated the juvenile offender’s right to equal protection of the laws.
In this case, the defendant was initially sentenced to LWOP. The defendant was later resentenced under § 1170(d)(1) to 50 years to life. The defendant was resentenced after Penal Code § 3051 was enacted, meaning the defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence included the availability of youth offender parole.
Was the defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence, combined with the availability of youth offender parole, the functional equivalent of LWOP—entitling the defendant to file a successive resentencing petition under § 1170(d)(10)?
Answer:
(1) No, defendant Valdez’s 50-year-to-life sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP in light of his eligibility to seek youth offender parole. Valdez was not eligible to seek resentencing under § 1170(d)(10).
Under People v. Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th 261, 279 (2016), “a life sentence with parole eligibility during” the defendant’s “25th year of incarceration” is not “the functional equivalent of LWOP.” Valdez was resentenced to a life sentence with parole eligibility during his 25th year of incarceration. Valdez was not resentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP.
Facts:
In 2000, a jury convicted Valdez of first-degree murder for a killing committed when Valdez was 17 years old. The jury found true a hate-crime special circumstance and a firearm enhancement. The superior court found true a gang enhancement. The superior court sentenced Valdez to 25 years to life plus LWOP.
In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170(d)(2) [now § 1170(d)(1)]. The superior court granted Valdez’s petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life.
In November 2022, Valdez became eligible for youth offender parole under Penal Code § 3051. Valdez received a parole hearing in December 2023. Parole was denied.
In October 2023, Valdez filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) and Heard. Valdez argued that he was entitled to resentencing under Heard because his sentence of 50 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP.
The superior court deemed Valdez’s petition a successive petition under Penal Code § 1170(d)(10) and granted Valdez’s petition. The superior court reasoned that Valdez’s 50-years-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that to deny Valdez the opportunity to seek resentencing would result in an equal-protection violation under Heard.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two granted the People’s petition for writ of mandate. The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to (1) vacate its order granting Valdez resentencing relief and (2) enter a new and different order denying the petition for resentencing.
Justice Menetrez authored the opinion, joined by Justices Ramirez and McKinster.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 441763
Case: People v. Martinez - 4DCA reverses superior court’s order that had dismissed criminal case based on purported speedy-trial violation
Decided: 2/7/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a purported violation of the defendant’s speedy-trial rights
Plaintiff-appellant: The People of the State of California
Defendant-respondent: Richard Martinez
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two case no.: E082657
Appeal from: Riverside Superior Court (Elias, J., of the San Diego Superior Court)
Advocates: Michael Hestrin and Kristen Allison for the People; Andrea Bitar for Martinez
Question:
(1) In January 2018, the People charged the defendant with one felony count of grand theft and three misdemeanors. The superior court arraigned the defendant on the complaint in December 2021. The superior court held the preliminary hearing in February 2023 and held the defendant to answer. The People promptly filed an information charging the defendant with the same offenses in the complaint. In September 2023, the defendant filed a “motion to dismiss based on pre-filing delay resulting in prejudice.” The defendant claimed that key witnesses were now unavailable. The defendant did not indicate which witnesses were permanently unavailable or the relevance of their testimony. The defendant also admitted that there was a possibility the witnesses could be found. The superior court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Did the superior court err in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss by not requiring the defendant to demonstrate prejudice?
Answer:
(1) The superior court erred in dismissing the defendant’s felony charge and needed to conduct the requisite federal speedy-trial analysis for the misdemeanor charges.
The speedy-trial analysis differs between federal and California law.
The federal speedy-trial right in felony cases attaches upon either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge. The filing of a felony complaint does not trigger federal speedy-trial protection. The defendant’s felony federal speedy-trial rights were not violated.
The federal speedy-trial right in misdemeanor cases attaches upon the filing of the complaint. The superior court must balance (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant in assessing whether a misdemeanor federal speedy-trial violation has occurred. A more-than-one-year delay in misdemeanor cases is presumptively prejudicial. The 46-month delay in this case was presumptively prejudicial. But the superior court did not conduct the requisite four-factor speedy-trial analysis, so remand was necessary for the superior court to reconsider.
The state speedy-trial right in felony cases is triggered by the filing of a felony complaint. But the defendant must show actual prejudice. The defendant’s assertions of prejudice were conclusionary and speculative. The defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. The defendant’s felony state speedy-trial rights were not violated.
The state speedy-trial right in misdemeanor cases attaches upon the defendant’s arrest or the filing of the misdemeanor complaint, whichever is first. The defendant must show actual prejudice. The defendant, again, failed to demonstrate actual prejudice.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two reversed the superior court’s order dismissing the case. The Fourth District Court of Appeal directed the superior court to enter an order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to the felony charge. For the misdemeanor charges, the Court directed the superior court to enter an order denying the defendant’s motion with respect to the defendant’s state constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court remanded for the superior court to determine whether the defendant’s misdemeanor federal speedy-trial rights were violated.
Justice McKinster authored the opinion, joined by Justices Miller and Fields.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 429628