Case: Plantations at Haywood 1, LLC v. Plantations at Haywood, LLC - 4DCA affirms sanctions order arising from opposition to petition to confirm arbitration award
Decided: 2/10/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order imposing monetary sanctions on objector-appellant
Plaintiffs: Plantations at Haywood 1, LLC, et al.
Defendant-respondent: Plantations at Haywood, LLC
Objector-appellant: Kenneth J. Catanzarite
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three case no.: G062909
Appeal from: Orange County Superior Court (Sherman, J.)
Advocates: Kenneth J. Catanzarite and Tim James O’Keefe for Catanzarite; Henry Oh and Edward Morales for Plantations
Facts:
In the underlying real estate dispute between plaintiffs—represented by Catanzarite—and defendant Plantations, plaintiffs alleged that they were defrauded into exchanging their interests in an apartment complex for interests in an LLC. Plaintiffs requested arbitration. The dispute was ordered into arbitration.
The arbitrator ruled in favor of Plantations. Plantations petitioned the superior court to confirm the arbitration award under Code of Civil Procedure § 1285. Catanzarite opposed, arguing the award should be vacated under § 1286.2(a)(4) (arbitrator exceeded his powers) and (a)(5) (arbitrator refused to “hear” material evidence). “Catanzarite’s argument was that because his documents had ‘plainly show[ed]’ facts that were inconsistent with the arbitrator’s award, the arbitrator must have ignored plaintiffs’ documents. In other words, since Catanzarite disagreed with the award, the arbitrator must have willfully ignored his clients’ evidence.”
Catanzarite sought an order vacating the arbitration award. Plantations responded by filing a motion for sanctions against Catanzarite under § 128.7. Plantations “pointed out that Catanzarite did not submit any evidence to support his claim ‘that the arbitrator refused to hear any evidence.’” “Instead, Plantations noted that Catanzarite conceded ‘that the arbitrator admitted “all or nearly all” of Plaintiffs’ documents and testimony into evidence,’ and relied on Gonzales v. Interinsurance Exchange (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 58, 63 (Gonzales), for the proposition that ‘[l]egally speaking, the admission of evidence is to hear it’—thus establishing that Catanzarite’s own concession had fatally undermined his claim.”
The superior court granted Plantations’s petition to confirm the arbitration award. The superior court granted Plantations’s motion for sanctions, finding that “plaintiffs’ omnibus opposition to defendants’ Petitions to Confirm the Arbitration Award was without merit under well-established law, was not supported by existing law, or any nonfrivolous extension of existing law, and was not supported by evidence.”
Catanzarite appealed from the order imposing monetary sanctions against him. In response, Plantations moved for monetary sanctions on the ground that Catanzarite’s appeal was frivolous. The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued an order informing the parties that it was considering imposing sanctions and inviting Catanzarite to file an opposition to Plantations’s motion.
Questions:
(1)
Did the superior court err in imposing monetary sanctions against Catanzarite under § 128.7?
(2)
Was Plantations entitled to sanctions on appeal?
Answers:
(1)
No, the superior court did not err in imposing monetary sanctions against Catanzarite.
In Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 27-28 (1992), the California Supreme Court “deemed it ‘well settled’ that an arbitrator’s error in the substance of an award—even when the error was patent—did not provide grounds to overturn the order in court.” The Fourth District Court of Appeal continued: “The [Moncharsh] court held that an arbitrator’s error of fact or law in deciding the issue submitted did not qualify as an act in excess of the arbitrator’s powers under section 1286.2.”
In Heimlich v. Shivji, 7 Cal. 5th 350 (2019), the California Supreme Court “held that ‘vacation of an award for “refusal . . . to hear evidence material to the controversy”’ cannot be grounded on a claim the court erred in the merits of its decision because ‘“if not properly limited, [section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5),] could swallow the rule that arbitration awards are not generally reviewable on the merits.”’”
The Heimlich court examined Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. v. Liebhaber, 2 Cal. App. 5th 1092 (2016), a refusal-to-hear-evidence case in which the Court of Appeal vacated an arbitration award. In Royal Alliance, the “arbitration panel allowed a securities broker to ‘speak, unsworn and at length,’ but ‘denied the former client the opportunity to cross-examine the broker or to speak herself’ because the panel apparently ‘felt itself too busy to allow each side the opportunity to present evidence.’” “The panel then issued a decision that ‘relied on the former client’s failure to dispute the broker’s account or to offer evidence of financial losses.’” “In vacating the decision, the appellate court in Royal Alliance concluded the arbitration panel’s refusal to hear from the former client ‘“was not fair.”’”
Heimlich “contrasted the situation in Royal Alliance, with the situation where arbitrators ‘refuse to consider evidence they find legally irrelevant, even if the irrelevance determination rests upon an incorrect legal foundation.’” “In that situation, ‘[n]either that determination nor the resulting refusal to consider evidence’ is grounds to vacate the award.”
In Gonzales v. Interinsurance Exchange, 84 Cal. App. 3d 58 (1978), the Second District Court of Appeal held that “the admission of evidence is to hear it, and the weighing of it is to give it consideration.”
Turning to this case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal found that Catanzarite’s “assertion that the arbitrator exceeded his powers” under § 1286.2(a)(4) because the arbitrator purportedly “erred in evaluating the evidence” was “directly contrary to Moncharsh—a case Catanzarite ignores other than to claim it allows for judicial review of arbitration awards.”
Catanzarite’s “assertion that the arbitrator failed to ‘hear’ the evidence he admitted is directly contradicted by Gonzales, a case Catanzarite failed to cite or acknowledge in his briefing. And while that initial omission might have been an oversight, Catanzarite did not back down when Gonzales was cited by Plantations.” Catanzarite instead pivoted to another case that “had been disapproved by the Supreme Court in Heimlich” and that “citation proved his bad faith.”
(2)
Yes, the Fourth District Court of Appeal found that sanctions on appeal were appropriate. Catanzarite’s appellate briefing “largely repeats the arguments found sanctionable by the trial court.” The Court found that Catanzarite’s appeal “lacks any semblance of merit.”
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three affirmed the superior court’s order imposing sanctions and granted Plantations’s motion for monetary sanctions on appeal. The Court remanded to the superior court with directions to conduct a hearing to determine the appropriate amount of sanctions to be awarded.
Justice Goethals authored the opinion, joined by Justices Sanchez and Delaney.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 444857
Case: People v. Superior Court (Valdez) - 4DCA denies resentencing relief to defendant who was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence he received at Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) resentencing
Decided: 2/10/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Petition for writ of mandate from the superior court’s order granting a Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) petition for resentencing
Petitioner: The People of the State of California
Respondent: The Superior Court of Riverside County
Real Party in Interest: Mariano Valdez
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two case no.: E084222
Petition from an order by: Riverside Superior Court (Molloy, J.)
Advocates: Michael Hestrin and W. Matthew Murray for the People; Steven Harmon, William Meronek, and Nicholas Kross for Valdez
Question:
(1) Under Penal Code § 1170(d)(1), a defendant who (i) was under 18 years old when he committed his offense, (ii) was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), and (iii) has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, may petition the sentencing court for the recall of his sentence and resentencing.
Under Penal Code § 1170(d)(10), if the defendant is resentenced to LWOP, “the defendant may submit another petition for recall and resentencing to the sentencing court when the defendant has been committed to the custody of the department for at least 20 years.”
In People v. Heard, 83 Cal. App. 5th 608, 632 (2022), the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One found that there was “no legitimate reason for making juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit life without parole terms eligible to seek resentencing but not juvenile offenders sentenced to the equivalent of a life without parole sentence.” The Heard Court held that denying a juvenile offender the opportunity to seek resentencing—when that offender was sentenced to 23 years plus 80 years to life, the functional equivalent of LWOP—violated the juvenile offender’s right to equal protection of the laws.
In this case, the defendant was initially sentenced to LWOP. The defendant was later resentenced under § 1170(d)(1) to 50 years to life. The defendant was resentenced after Penal Code § 3051 was enacted, meaning the defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence included the availability of youth offender parole.
Was the defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence, combined with the availability of youth offender parole, the functional equivalent of LWOP—entitling the defendant to file a successive resentencing petition under § 1170(d)(10)?
Answer:
(1) No, defendant Valdez’s 50-year-to-life sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP in light of his eligibility to seek youth offender parole. Valdez was not eligible to seek resentencing under § 1170(d)(10).
Under People v. Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th 261, 279 (2016), “a life sentence with parole eligibility during” the defendant’s “25th year of incarceration” is not “the functional equivalent of LWOP.” Valdez was resentenced to a life sentence with parole eligibility during his 25th year of incarceration. Valdez was not resentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP.
Facts:
In 2000, a jury convicted Valdez of first-degree murder for a killing committed when Valdez was 17 years old. The jury found true a hate-crime special circumstance and a firearm enhancement. The superior court found true a gang enhancement. The superior court sentenced Valdez to 25 years to life plus LWOP.
In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170(d)(2) [now § 1170(d)(1)]. The superior court granted Valdez’s petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life.
In November 2022, Valdez became eligible for youth offender parole under Penal Code § 3051. Valdez received a parole hearing in December 2023. Parole was denied.
In October 2023, Valdez filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) and Heard. Valdez argued that he was entitled to resentencing under Heard because his sentence of 50 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP.
The superior court deemed Valdez’s petition a successive petition under Penal Code § 1170(d)(10) and granted Valdez’s petition. The superior court reasoned that Valdez’s 50-years-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that to deny Valdez the opportunity to seek resentencing would result in an equal-protection violation under Heard.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two granted the People’s petition for writ of mandate. The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to (1) vacate its order granting Valdez resentencing relief and (2) enter a new and different order denying the petition for resentencing.
Justice Menetrez authored the opinion, joined by Justices Ramirez and McKinster.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 441763
Case: People v. Martinez - 4DCA reverses superior court’s order that had dismissed criminal case based on purported speedy-trial violation
Decided: 2/7/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a purported violation of the defendant’s speedy-trial rights
Plaintiff-appellant: The People of the State of California
Defendant-respondent: Richard Martinez
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two case no.: E082657
Appeal from: Riverside Superior Court (Elias, J., of the San Diego Superior Court)
Advocates: Michael Hestrin and Kristen Allison for the People; Andrea Bitar for Martinez
Question:
(1) In January 2018, the People charged the defendant with one felony count of grand theft and three misdemeanors. The superior court arraigned the defendant on the complaint in December 2021. The superior court held the preliminary hearing in February 2023 and held the defendant to answer. The People promptly filed an information charging the defendant with the same offenses in the complaint. In September 2023, the defendant filed a “motion to dismiss based on pre-filing delay resulting in prejudice.” The defendant claimed that key witnesses were now unavailable. The defendant did not indicate which witnesses were permanently unavailable or the relevance of their testimony. The defendant also admitted that there was a possibility the witnesses could be found. The superior court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Did the superior court err in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss by not requiring the defendant to demonstrate prejudice?
Answer:
(1) The superior court erred in dismissing the defendant’s felony charge and needed to conduct the requisite federal speedy-trial analysis for the misdemeanor charges.
The speedy-trial analysis differs between federal and California law.
The federal speedy-trial right in felony cases attaches upon either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge. The filing of a felony complaint does not trigger federal speedy-trial protection. The defendant’s felony federal speedy-trial rights were not violated.
The federal speedy-trial right in misdemeanor cases attaches upon the filing of the complaint. The superior court must balance (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant in assessing whether a misdemeanor federal speedy-trial violation has occurred. A more-than-one-year delay in misdemeanor cases is presumptively prejudicial. The 46-month delay in this case was presumptively prejudicial. But the superior court did not conduct the requisite four-factor speedy-trial analysis, so remand was necessary for the superior court to reconsider.
The state speedy-trial right in felony cases is triggered by the filing of a felony complaint. But the defendant must show actual prejudice. The defendant’s assertions of prejudice were conclusionary and speculative. The defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. The defendant’s felony state speedy-trial rights were not violated.
The state speedy-trial right in misdemeanor cases attaches upon the defendant’s arrest or the filing of the misdemeanor complaint, whichever is first. The defendant must show actual prejudice. The defendant, again, failed to demonstrate actual prejudice.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two reversed the superior court’s order dismissing the case. The Fourth District Court of Appeal directed the superior court to enter an order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to the felony charge. For the misdemeanor charges, the Court directed the superior court to enter an order denying the defendant’s motion with respect to the defendant’s state constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court remanded for the superior court to determine whether the defendant’s misdemeanor federal speedy-trial rights were violated.
Justice McKinster authored the opinion, joined by Justices Miller and Fields.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 429628
Case: People v. Gonzalez - 4DCA holds that a remand for recalculation of presentencing credits does not entitle a defendant to a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code § 1170
Decided: 2/7/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order recalculating presentencing credits and denying the defendant’s request for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170
Plaintiff-respondent: The People of the State of California
Defendant-appellant: Jesse Gonzalez, Jr.
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One case no.: D082662
Appeal from: Imperial Superior Court (Plourd, J.)
Advocates: Laura Vavakin for Gonzalez; Steven Oetting for the People
Question:
(1) Does an appellate court’s remand for recalculation of presentencing credits constitute a new pronouncement of judgment and entitle a defendant to a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code § 1170?
Answer:
(1) No. The proper approach is to correct the credit count without vacating the convictions or associated sentences. “Because it is only after a sentence is vacated that the judgment becomes nonfinal and subject to the resentencing considerations, we further conclude a full resentencing is not appropriate under these circumstances.” (Citation omitted.)
Facts:
In 2012, a jury convicted Gonzalez of attempted deliberate premeditated murder and assault with a deadly weapon, with enhancements for inflicting great bodily injury. The superior court sentenced Gonzalez to an aggregate term of 17 years to life, with the possibility of parole, and gave Gonzalez credit for 700 days served.
A month later, the superior court recalled Gonzalez’s sentence under Penal Code § 1170(d). The superior court resentenced Gonzalez without specifying whether the sentence included the possibility of parole and without changing the credit calculation.
On Gonzalez’s direct appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal ordered corrections to the abstract of judgment to reflect that Gonzalez’s sentence was life in prison with the possibility of parole plus six years for the enhancements.
In 2022, Gonzalez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his sentence was not corrected and his credits were incorrectly calculated. The superior court summarily denied Gonzalez’s petition.
Gonzalez filed a habeas petition in the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted Gonzalez’s petition in part and remanded for recalculation of Gonzalez’s custody credits.
On remand, the superior court ordered the abstract of judgment amended to reflect credit for 759 days. Gonzalez appealed. Gonzalez’s appellate counsel notified the superior court of an error in the revised calculation. The superior court again amended the abstract, this time to reflect credit for 771 days.
Gonzalez’s appellate counsel filed a Wende brief. Gonzalez filed a supplemental brief. The Fourth District Court of Appeal ordered briefing on the question presented above.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One affirmed the superior court’s order denying Gonzalez’s request for a full resentencing.
Justice Huffman authored the opinion, joined by Justices Kelety and Castillo.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 428446
Case: Hay v. Marinkovich - 4DCA holds that statute prohibiting unauthorized use of computers for improper purpose allows an award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants, limits availability of fees
Decided: 2/6/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the San Diego Superior Court’s order granting defendant’s costs but denying defendant’s request for attorney fees
Plaintiff-respondent: Emoke Hay
Defendant-appellant: David Marinkovich
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One case no.: D08561
Appeal from: San Diego Superior Court (Caietti, J.)
Advocates: Kendra Hall and Sean Sullivan for Hay; Ron Stormoen and Amber Babin for Marinkovich
Question:
(1) Does Penal Code § 502, which prohibits the unauthorized use of any computer system for an improper purpose, allow an award of attorney fees to a prevailing defendant in a civil case?
(2) Under what circumstances can a prevailing defendant recover attorney fees under Penal Code § 502?
Answer:
(1) Yes, a prevailing defendant in a Penal Code § 502 civil case can recover attorney fees.
(2) A prevailing defendant can recover attorney fees only where the plaintiff’s claim was “objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” The superior court in this case acted “well within its discretion” in finding that plaintiff’s claim was not frivolous or abusive.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One affirmed the superior court’s order awarding costs to Marinkovich and denying Marinkovich’s request for fees.
Justice Buchanan authored the opinion, joined by Justices Irion and Rubin.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 414655