Case: Skouti v. Franchise Tax Board - 3DCA rules for tax board in nonrecognition-of-gain dispute; plaintiffs’ destroyed grapevines not sufficiently similar to replacement orchard under IRC § 1033
Decided: 2/11/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order granting summary judgment to the Franchise Tax Board
Plaintiff-appellants: Ahmad Skouti, et al.
Defendant-respondent: Franchise Tax Board
Third District Court of Appeal case no.: C100135
Appeal from: Sacramento Superior Court (Krueger, J.)
Advocates: J. Jackson Waste and Joseph J. Doerr for Skouti; Jennifer Henderson and Lauren Freeman for the Franchise Tax Board
Facts:
Grape-farmer plaintiffs won a $7.5 million jury award against their crop advisor, $3,260,166 of which was for damage to raisin crop between 2002 and 2004. Plaintiffs collected the judgment in 2007.
In 2007, plaintiffs elected for the raisin-crop damage portion of the jury award to be treated under Internal Revenue Code § 1033 (adopted for California tax law through Revenue & Taxation Code § 18031). IRC § 1033 permits nonrecognition of gain from involuntary conversions of property if the taxpayer “purchases other property similar or related in service or use to the property so converted.”
Defendant Franchise Tax Board rejected the plaintiffs’ request for IRC § 1033 treatment for plaintiffs’ state income tax return. Plaintiffs exhausted administrative remedies and filed a complaint against the Board for refund of taxes.
Plaintiffs and the Board cross-moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs said that they used the $3,260,166 to purchase citrus orchards to replace the destroyed vines. Plaintiffs asserted that the citrus orchards were similar to the damaged vineyards “in that they contained mature perennial crops that were farmed for commercial agricultural production and harvested once each year for sale to consumers.”
The superior court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the replacement property—the citrus orchards—was not sufficiently similar to the destroyed grapevines under IRC § 1033.
Question:
(1) Did the plaintiffs’ purchase of a citrus orchard to replace destroyed (involuntarily converted) grapevines qualify for nonrecognition-of-gain treatment under IRC § 1033?
Answer:
(1) No, the plaintiffs did not satisfy IRC § 1033 because the destroyed grapevines were not similar to, or related in service or use to, the citrus orchard.
The similarity test under IRC § 1033 is a practical one. Has the taxpayer achieved a sufficient continuity of investment to justify the non-recognition of the gain from the destroyed property? Or are the differences between the destroyed property and replacement property so great as to “compel the conclusion” that the taxpayer took advantage of the conversion to change the nature of the taxpayer’s investment? Davis v. United States, 589 F.2d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1979).
Here, the destroyed property was plaintiffs’ grapevines. These agricultural fixtures are improvements to land. The replacement property was a citrus orchard that consisted of “both agricultural fixtures and land.” Slip Op. at 6.
Agricultural fixtures by themselves represent a different investment than land with agricultural fixtures. The risks are different. For example, if the plaintiffs’ citrus trees were destroyed, the “plaintiffs could still have two parcels of productive land even if all agricultural fixtures were damaged.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ “purchase of land containing agricultural fixtures does not constitute a continuation of their investment in agricultural fixtures alone.” Id. at 8.
Outcome:
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court’s order granting summary judgment to the Franchise Tax Board and the resulting judgment of dismissal.
Justice Robie authored the opinion, joined by Justices Earl and Duarte.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 455471
Case: In re L.G. - 2DCA suppresses evidence from an illegal search
Decided: 2/11/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress
Plaintiff-respondent: The People of the State of California
Defendant-appellant: L.G.
Second District Court of Appeal, Division Eight case no.: B331298
Appeal from: Los Angeles Superior Court (Lawson, J.)
Advocates: Steven Torres for L.G.; Ryan M. Smith for the People
Facts:
Officers Victor Quezada and Diego Millan were patrolling Harbor City Crips gang territory after dark. Millan saw three young men standing on a sidewalk and recognized one—not defendant L.G.—as a gang member. The officers pulled up to the men in their marked cruiser. Officer Quezada tried to engage the men in conversation. L.G. did not respond. When Quezada directed questions at L.G., who was 15 years old, L.G. did not look at the officers. L.G. looked sideways and at the ground. The interaction lasted about a minute.
Millan and Quezada suspected L.G. was carrying illegal drugs or a gun. The two officers left the police cruiser. Quezada told L.G. and the others to “Step out to the street! Get your hands up!” L.G. “took off at a run, clutching his waistband as if he were holding a gun.” The officers caught up to L.G. and found that L.G. was carrying a gun.
Question:
(1) Did the officers detain L.G. and, if so, was the detention and subsequent search improper?
Answer:
(1) Yes, the officers detained L.G. Yes, the detention and search were improper.
Once the police said, “Step out to the street! Get your hands up!” and advanced toward L.G., “reasonable people in L.G.’s situation would not believe they were free to leave.” “The objective observer would conclude officers were getting out of the car for a reason beyond casual conversation.”
The officers lacked a particularized and objective basis for believing L.G. was breaking the law. L.G.’s nervousness was not enough. Being nervous and deliberately avoiding police interaction did not reasonably suggest criminal activity was afoot. The gang status of one of the other men—not L.G.—”was relevant but not a license to frisk his companions anytime and anywhere.” The fact that L.G. was eventually caught carrying a gun does not change the analysis.
Outcome:
The Second District Court of Appeal, Division Eight reversed the judgment, vacated the adjudication, and remanded the matter with instructions to the superior court to enter a new order granting L.G.’s motion to suppress.
Justice Wiley authored the opinion, joined by Justices Stratton and Grimes.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 455479
Case: Plantations at Haywood 1, LLC v. Plantations at Haywood, LLC - 4DCA affirms sanctions order arising from opposition to petition to confirm arbitration award
Decided: 2/10/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order imposing monetary sanctions on objector-appellant
Plaintiffs: Plantations at Haywood 1, LLC, et al.
Defendant-respondent: Plantations at Haywood, LLC
Objector-appellant: Kenneth J. Catanzarite
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three case no.: G062909
Appeal from: Orange County Superior Court (Sherman, J.)
Advocates: Kenneth J. Catanzarite and Tim James O’Keefe for Catanzarite; Henry Oh and Edward Morales for Plantations
Facts:
In the underlying real estate dispute between plaintiffs—represented by Catanzarite—and defendant Plantations, plaintiffs alleged that they were defrauded into exchanging their interests in an apartment complex for interests in an LLC. Plaintiffs requested arbitration. The dispute was ordered into arbitration.
The arbitrator ruled in favor of Plantations. Plantations petitioned the superior court to confirm the arbitration award under Code of Civil Procedure § 1285. Catanzarite opposed, arguing the award should be vacated under § 1286.2(a)(4) (arbitrator exceeded his powers) and (a)(5) (arbitrator refused to “hear” material evidence). “Catanzarite’s argument was that because his documents had ‘plainly show[ed]’ facts that were inconsistent with the arbitrator’s award, the arbitrator must have ignored plaintiffs’ documents. In other words, since Catanzarite disagreed with the award, the arbitrator must have willfully ignored his clients’ evidence.”
Catanzarite sought an order vacating the arbitration award. Plantations responded by filing a motion for sanctions against Catanzarite under § 128.7. Plantations “pointed out that Catanzarite did not submit any evidence to support his claim ‘that the arbitrator refused to hear any evidence.’” “Instead, Plantations noted that Catanzarite conceded ‘that the arbitrator admitted “all or nearly all” of Plaintiffs’ documents and testimony into evidence,’ and relied on Gonzales v. Interinsurance Exchange (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 58, 63 (Gonzales), for the proposition that ‘[l]egally speaking, the admission of evidence is to hear it’—thus establishing that Catanzarite’s own concession had fatally undermined his claim.”
The superior court granted Plantations’s petition to confirm the arbitration award. The superior court granted Plantations’s motion for sanctions, finding that “plaintiffs’ omnibus opposition to defendants’ Petitions to Confirm the Arbitration Award was without merit under well-established law, was not supported by existing law, or any nonfrivolous extension of existing law, and was not supported by evidence.”
Catanzarite appealed from the order imposing monetary sanctions against him. In response, Plantations moved for monetary sanctions on the ground that Catanzarite’s appeal was frivolous. The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued an order informing the parties that it was considering imposing sanctions and inviting Catanzarite to file an opposition to Plantations’s motion.
Questions:
(1)
Did the superior court err in imposing monetary sanctions against Catanzarite under § 128.7?
(2)
Was Plantations entitled to sanctions on appeal?
Answers:
(1)
No, the superior court did not err in imposing monetary sanctions against Catanzarite.
In Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 27-28 (1992), the California Supreme Court “deemed it ‘well settled’ that an arbitrator’s error in the substance of an award—even when the error was patent—did not provide grounds to overturn the order in court.” The Fourth District Court of Appeal continued: “The [Moncharsh] court held that an arbitrator’s error of fact or law in deciding the issue submitted did not qualify as an act in excess of the arbitrator’s powers under section 1286.2.”
In Heimlich v. Shivji, 7 Cal. 5th 350 (2019), the California Supreme Court “held that ‘vacation of an award for “refusal . . . to hear evidence material to the controversy”’ cannot be grounded on a claim the court erred in the merits of its decision because ‘“if not properly limited, [section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5),] could swallow the rule that arbitration awards are not generally reviewable on the merits.”’”
The Heimlich court examined Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. v. Liebhaber, 2 Cal. App. 5th 1092 (2016), a refusal-to-hear-evidence case in which the Court of Appeal vacated an arbitration award. In Royal Alliance, the “arbitration panel allowed a securities broker to ‘speak, unsworn and at length,’ but ‘denied the former client the opportunity to cross-examine the broker or to speak herself’ because the panel apparently ‘felt itself too busy to allow each side the opportunity to present evidence.’” “The panel then issued a decision that ‘relied on the former client’s failure to dispute the broker’s account or to offer evidence of financial losses.’” “In vacating the decision, the appellate court in Royal Alliance concluded the arbitration panel’s refusal to hear from the former client ‘“was not fair.”’”
Heimlich “contrasted the situation in Royal Alliance, with the situation where arbitrators ‘refuse to consider evidence they find legally irrelevant, even if the irrelevance determination rests upon an incorrect legal foundation.’” “In that situation, ‘[n]either that determination nor the resulting refusal to consider evidence’ is grounds to vacate the award.”
In Gonzales v. Interinsurance Exchange, 84 Cal. App. 3d 58 (1978), the Second District Court of Appeal held that “the admission of evidence is to hear it, and the weighing of it is to give it consideration.”
Turning to this case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal found that Catanzarite’s “assertion that the arbitrator exceeded his powers” under § 1286.2(a)(4) because the arbitrator purportedly “erred in evaluating the evidence” was “directly contrary to Moncharsh—a case Catanzarite ignores other than to claim it allows for judicial review of arbitration awards.”
Catanzarite’s “assertion that the arbitrator failed to ‘hear’ the evidence he admitted is directly contradicted by Gonzales, a case Catanzarite failed to cite or acknowledge in his briefing. And while that initial omission might have been an oversight, Catanzarite did not back down when Gonzales was cited by Plantations.” Catanzarite instead pivoted to another case that “had been disapproved by the Supreme Court in Heimlich” and that “citation proved his bad faith.”
(2)
Yes, the Fourth District Court of Appeal found that sanctions on appeal were appropriate. Catanzarite’s appellate briefing “largely repeats the arguments found sanctionable by the trial court.” The Court found that Catanzarite’s appeal “lacks any semblance of merit.”
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three affirmed the superior court’s order imposing sanctions and granted Plantations’s motion for monetary sanctions on appeal. The Court remanded to the superior court with directions to conduct a hearing to determine the appropriate amount of sanctions to be awarded.
Justice Goethals authored the opinion, joined by Justices Sanchez and Delaney.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 444857
Case: Optronic Techs., Inc. v. Celestron Acquisition, LLC - 2DCA revives plaintiff’s fraudulent-transfer claim based on conspiracy and/or aiding-and-abetting theory of liability
Certified for Partial Publication: 2/10/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order sustaining defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend
Plaintiff-appellant: Optronic Technologies, Inc. (Orion)
Defendant-respondent: Celestron Acquisition, LLC
Second District Court of Appeal, Division Four case no.: B330798
Appeal from: Los Angeles Superior Court (Fruin, J.)
Advocates: J. Noah Hagey, Matthew Borden, and Kory DeClark for Optronic; Christopher Frost, Joshua Stambaugh, and Nicholas Lauber for Celestron
Facts:
Antitrust Litigation
California-based Optronic Technologies, Inc., d/b/a Orion Telescopes & Binoculars (Orion) sued Chinese telescope manufacturer Ningbo Sunny and its subsidiaries for antitrust violations. Orion alleged that Ningbo Sunny and the other defendants colluded and conspired with third-party telescope manufacturers in China to fix prices, control and restrict output, and divide the $200 million market for manufacturing and distribution of recreational telescopes and components sold in the United States.
Orion’s federal antitrust complaint alleged that there were unnamed “settling parties” who participated in the alleged antitrust conduct but had settled and resolved Orion’s claims. On appeal, Orion alleged that these settling parties included Celestron Acquisition, LLC (Celestron).
In November 2019, a jury ruled in Orion’s favor in the antitrust action. The federal district court entered a judgment in favor of Orion for $54 million, which included treble damages.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a), Orion could not enforce the judgment for 30 days. The stay of the execution of the judgment was set to expire on January 5, 2020.
Before judgment was entered, Orion moved for a restraining order to bar Ningbo Sunny from removing assets, including accounts receivable, from the United States.
On December 10, 2019, Ningbo Sunny filed a declaration by its president that stated, in part, that “Ningbo will not transfer any of its cash or other assets located in the United States to a location outside of the United States other than in the ordinary course of business while post-trial motions and appeals remain pending.”
The district court denied Orion’s application for a restraining order.
Celestron had received inventory from Ningbo Sunny throughout 2019 and owed Ningbo Sunny a “substantial” sum for that inventory. Celestron paid Ningbo Sunny on a “net 100” basis, meaning Celestron paid for any inventory within 100 days of receiving the invoice for the inventory.
On January 2, 2020, Celestron paid Ningbo Sunny $4,184,057.70 for outstanding invoices. On January 13, 2020, Orion served Celestron with a notice of levy under writ of execution. On January 17, 2020, the district court issued an order assigning all of Ningbo Sunny’s Celestron-based accounts receivable to Orion.
When Orion discovered Celestron’s January 2 payment, Orion moved for sanctions against Ningbo Sunny in the federal district court. Orion noted that under the Ningbo Sunny-Celestron payment terms, payment for invoices from October or later was due no earlier than mid-January 2020. In seeking sanctions, Orion introduced an email dated January 1, 2020 from Ningbo Sunny to Celestron, in which Ningbo Sunny asked Celestron to “pay as much payment as possible this week.” The federal district court granted Orion’s motion for sanctions in March 2020.
This Litigation
In November 2022, Orion filed a complaint against Celestron. Orion alleged that “Celestron made early payment of the accounts receivable to Ningbo Sunny outside the ordinary course of business, knowing that Ningbo Sunny had avoided an injunction that would have prevented such a transfer by making a fraudulent representation under oath to the District Court that it would not make such transfers.”
Orion asserted two claims against Celestron. Orion’s first claim was for actual fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, Civil Code § 3439.04(a). Orion claimed that Celestron was directly liable for fraudulent transfer and vicariously liable for aiding, abetting, and conspiring in the wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint. Orion’s second claim was for tortious interference.
Celestron filed a demurrer, a motion to strike portions of the complaint, and a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16.
The superior court sustained Celestron’s demurrer without leave to amend. For the UTVA claim, the superior court stated that the statute did not “apply to Celestron’s payment of a business debt it owed” to Ningbo Sunny. The superior court reasoned that the only transfer that the UTVA makes voidable is one that a debtor owes to a creditor, but that Orion was not Celestron’s creditor. The superior court did not address Orion’s conspiracy or aiding-and-abetting theories of fraudulent-transfer liability.
The superior court stated that counsel had stipulated that Celestron’s motion to strike and anti-SLAPP motion were withdrawn. The superior court concluded the proceedings. Orion filed a notice of appeal.
Questions:
(1)
Did Orion plead a viable fraudulent-transfer claim against Celestron on a theory of direct liability—that Celestron could be liable under the UTVA either as a “debtor” or as a “person for whose benefit the transfer was made”?
(2)
Did Orion plead a viable fraudulent-transfer claim against Celestron on a theory of vicarious liability—that Celestron could be liable as a coconspirator or an aider and abettor to Ningbo Sunny’s fraudulent transfer?
Answers:
(1)
No, on the properly pleaded factual allegations here, Celestron could not be liable under the UTVA as a “debtor” or as a “person for whose benefit the transfer was made.”
Under the UTVA, a “transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation” with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.”
The Second District Court of Appeal found no authority holding that a debtor’s debtor (Celestron) could be considered the creditor’s (Orion’s) debtor for purposes of the UTVA. The Court was “not persuaded that Celestron, a stranger to the judgment between Orion and Ningbo Sunny, became Orion’s debtor because Ningbo Sunny was Orion’s debtor.”
The Court rejected Orion’s argument that Celestron could be directly liable for fraudulent transfer because Celestron was a transfer beneficiary under the UTVA. The UTVA allows a creditor to “recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred,” and the “judgment may be entered against” the “first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made.” Civil Code § 3439.08(b)(1)(A).
Transfer beneficiary status depends on three factors: (1) whether the beneficiary actually received the benefit; (2) whether the benefit is quantifiable; and (3) whether the benefit is accessible to the beneficiary.
Celestron claimed that it did not “receive” the transfer—Celestron paid Ningbo Sunny. Celestron said that any payment-derived “benefit” in its business relationship with Ningbo Sunny was not quantifiable or subject to disgorgement. The Court agreed with Celestron.
(2)
Yes, Orion’s complaint adequately stated a claim for conspiracy and/or aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer. Orion alleged that Celestron and Ningbo Sunny arranged and completed the transfer outside the course of ordinary business for the purpose of thwarding Orion’s efforts to collect on its judgment against Ningbo Sunny. Orion alleged that Celestron was aware of Orion’s judgment and Ningbo Sunny’s president’s declaration about not transferring assets out of the United States. Orion alleged that Celestron “directly participated in a scheme to orchestrate the Fraudulent Transfer,” and was “separately liable because” Celestron “aided and abetted and conspired in the wrongful conduct.” The Court found that these allegations were sufficient to state a claim.
The Court rejected Celestron’s argument that Orion had not adequately alleged damages. Celestron argued that because Orion already had a judgment against Ningbo Sunny, recovering the roughly $4.2 million from Celestron would constitute a prohibited double recovery. The Court noted that Orion sought declaratory relief, costs, and the attorney fees Orion incurred in attempting to recover the transferred assets. The Court continued: “Damages claims such as costs of suit may ‘fall within the scope of recoverable tort damages and satisfy the damage element for a fraudulent transfer claim for purposes of demurrer.’” (Citation omitted.)
Outcome:
The Second District Court of Appeal, Division Four reversed the judgment of the superior court and remanded. The Second District Court of Appeal directed the superior court to enter a new order overruling Celestron’s demurrer on the fraudulent-transfer claim and sustaining the demurrer on the tortious-interference claim.
Justice Collins authored the opinion, joined by Justices Currey and Zukin.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 444853
Case: People v. Superior Court (Valdez) - 4DCA denies resentencing relief to defendant who was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence he received at Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) resentencing
Decided: 2/10/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Petition for writ of mandate from the superior court’s order granting a Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) petition for resentencing
Petitioner: The People of the State of California
Respondent: The Superior Court of Riverside County
Real Party in Interest: Mariano Valdez
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two case no.: E084222
Petition from an order by: Riverside Superior Court (Molloy, J.)
Advocates: Michael Hestrin and W. Matthew Murray for the People; Steven Harmon, William Meronek, and Nicholas Kross for Valdez
Question:
(1) Under Penal Code § 1170(d)(1), a defendant who (i) was under 18 years old when he committed his offense, (ii) was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), and (iii) has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, may petition the sentencing court for the recall of his sentence and resentencing.
Under Penal Code § 1170(d)(10), if the defendant is resentenced to LWOP, “the defendant may submit another petition for recall and resentencing to the sentencing court when the defendant has been committed to the custody of the department for at least 20 years.”
In People v. Heard, 83 Cal. App. 5th 608, 632 (2022), the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One found that there was “no legitimate reason for making juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit life without parole terms eligible to seek resentencing but not juvenile offenders sentenced to the equivalent of a life without parole sentence.” The Heard Court held that denying a juvenile offender the opportunity to seek resentencing—when that offender was sentenced to 23 years plus 80 years to life, the functional equivalent of LWOP—violated the juvenile offender’s right to equal protection of the laws.
In this case, the defendant was initially sentenced to LWOP. The defendant was later resentenced under § 1170(d)(1) to 50 years to life. The defendant was resentenced after Penal Code § 3051 was enacted, meaning the defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence included the availability of youth offender parole.
Was the defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence, combined with the availability of youth offender parole, the functional equivalent of LWOP—entitling the defendant to file a successive resentencing petition under § 1170(d)(10)?
Answer:
(1) No, defendant Valdez’s 50-year-to-life sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP in light of his eligibility to seek youth offender parole. Valdez was not eligible to seek resentencing under § 1170(d)(10).
Under People v. Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th 261, 279 (2016), “a life sentence with parole eligibility during” the defendant’s “25th year of incarceration” is not “the functional equivalent of LWOP.” Valdez was resentenced to a life sentence with parole eligibility during his 25th year of incarceration. Valdez was not resentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP.
Facts:
In 2000, a jury convicted Valdez of first-degree murder for a killing committed when Valdez was 17 years old. The jury found true a hate-crime special circumstance and a firearm enhancement. The superior court found true a gang enhancement. The superior court sentenced Valdez to 25 years to life plus LWOP.
In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170(d)(2) [now § 1170(d)(1)]. The superior court granted Valdez’s petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life.
In November 2022, Valdez became eligible for youth offender parole under Penal Code § 3051. Valdez received a parole hearing in December 2023. Parole was denied.
In October 2023, Valdez filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) and Heard. Valdez argued that he was entitled to resentencing under Heard because his sentence of 50 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP.
The superior court deemed Valdez’s petition a successive petition under Penal Code § 1170(d)(10) and granted Valdez’s petition. The superior court reasoned that Valdez’s 50-years-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that to deny Valdez the opportunity to seek resentencing would result in an equal-protection violation under Heard.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two granted the People’s petition for writ of mandate. The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to (1) vacate its order granting Valdez resentencing relief and (2) enter a new and different order denying the petition for resentencing.
Justice Menetrez authored the opinion, joined by Justices Ramirez and McKinster.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 441763
Case: People v. Martinez - 4DCA reverses superior court’s order that had dismissed criminal case based on purported speedy-trial violation
Decided: 2/7/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a purported violation of the defendant’s speedy-trial rights
Plaintiff-appellant: The People of the State of California
Defendant-respondent: Richard Martinez
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two case no.: E082657
Appeal from: Riverside Superior Court (Elias, J., of the San Diego Superior Court)
Advocates: Michael Hestrin and Kristen Allison for the People; Andrea Bitar for Martinez
Question:
(1) In January 2018, the People charged the defendant with one felony count of grand theft and three misdemeanors. The superior court arraigned the defendant on the complaint in December 2021. The superior court held the preliminary hearing in February 2023 and held the defendant to answer. The People promptly filed an information charging the defendant with the same offenses in the complaint. In September 2023, the defendant filed a “motion to dismiss based on pre-filing delay resulting in prejudice.” The defendant claimed that key witnesses were now unavailable. The defendant did not indicate which witnesses were permanently unavailable or the relevance of their testimony. The defendant also admitted that there was a possibility the witnesses could be found. The superior court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Did the superior court err in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss by not requiring the defendant to demonstrate prejudice?
Answer:
(1) The superior court erred in dismissing the defendant’s felony charge and needed to conduct the requisite federal speedy-trial analysis for the misdemeanor charges.
The speedy-trial analysis differs between federal and California law.
The federal speedy-trial right in felony cases attaches upon either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge. The filing of a felony complaint does not trigger federal speedy-trial protection. The defendant’s felony federal speedy-trial rights were not violated.
The federal speedy-trial right in misdemeanor cases attaches upon the filing of the complaint. The superior court must balance (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant in assessing whether a misdemeanor federal speedy-trial violation has occurred. A more-than-one-year delay in misdemeanor cases is presumptively prejudicial. The 46-month delay in this case was presumptively prejudicial. But the superior court did not conduct the requisite four-factor speedy-trial analysis, so remand was necessary for the superior court to reconsider.
The state speedy-trial right in felony cases is triggered by the filing of a felony complaint. But the defendant must show actual prejudice. The defendant’s assertions of prejudice were conclusionary and speculative. The defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. The defendant’s felony state speedy-trial rights were not violated.
The state speedy-trial right in misdemeanor cases attaches upon the defendant’s arrest or the filing of the misdemeanor complaint, whichever is first. The defendant must show actual prejudice. The defendant, again, failed to demonstrate actual prejudice.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two reversed the superior court’s order dismissing the case. The Fourth District Court of Appeal directed the superior court to enter an order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to the felony charge. For the misdemeanor charges, the Court directed the superior court to enter an order denying the defendant’s motion with respect to the defendant’s state constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court remanded for the superior court to determine whether the defendant’s misdemeanor federal speedy-trial rights were violated.
Justice McKinster authored the opinion, joined by Justices Miller and Fields.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 429628
Case: People v. Gonzalez - 4DCA holds that a remand for recalculation of presentencing credits does not entitle a defendant to a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code § 1170
Decided: 2/7/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order recalculating presentencing credits and denying the defendant’s request for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170
Plaintiff-respondent: The People of the State of California
Defendant-appellant: Jesse Gonzalez, Jr.
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One case no.: D082662
Appeal from: Imperial Superior Court (Plourd, J.)
Advocates: Laura Vavakin for Gonzalez; Steven Oetting for the People
Question:
(1) Does an appellate court’s remand for recalculation of presentencing credits constitute a new pronouncement of judgment and entitle a defendant to a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code § 1170?
Answer:
(1) No. The proper approach is to correct the credit count without vacating the convictions or associated sentences. “Because it is only after a sentence is vacated that the judgment becomes nonfinal and subject to the resentencing considerations, we further conclude a full resentencing is not appropriate under these circumstances.” (Citation omitted.)
Facts:
In 2012, a jury convicted Gonzalez of attempted deliberate premeditated murder and assault with a deadly weapon, with enhancements for inflicting great bodily injury. The superior court sentenced Gonzalez to an aggregate term of 17 years to life, with the possibility of parole, and gave Gonzalez credit for 700 days served.
A month later, the superior court recalled Gonzalez’s sentence under Penal Code § 1170(d). The superior court resentenced Gonzalez without specifying whether the sentence included the possibility of parole and without changing the credit calculation.
On Gonzalez’s direct appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal ordered corrections to the abstract of judgment to reflect that Gonzalez’s sentence was life in prison with the possibility of parole plus six years for the enhancements.
In 2022, Gonzalez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his sentence was not corrected and his credits were incorrectly calculated. The superior court summarily denied Gonzalez’s petition.
Gonzalez filed a habeas petition in the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted Gonzalez’s petition in part and remanded for recalculation of Gonzalez’s custody credits.
On remand, the superior court ordered the abstract of judgment amended to reflect credit for 759 days. Gonzalez appealed. Gonzalez’s appellate counsel notified the superior court of an error in the revised calculation. The superior court again amended the abstract, this time to reflect credit for 771 days.
Gonzalez’s appellate counsel filed a Wende brief. Gonzalez filed a supplemental brief. The Fourth District Court of Appeal ordered briefing on the question presented above.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One affirmed the superior court’s order denying Gonzalez’s request for a full resentencing.
Justice Huffman authored the opinion, joined by Justices Kelety and Castillo.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 428446
Case: Gharibian v. Wawanesa Gen. Ins. Co. - 2DCA holds that removable wildfire debris did not cause direct physical loss to plaintiffs’ property in insurance suit
Decided: 2/7/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment
Plaintiffs-appellants: Hovik Gharibian, et al.
Defendant-respondent: Wawanesa General Insurance Company
Second District Court of Appeal, Division Two case no.: B325859
Appeal from: Los Angeles Superior Court (Meiers, J.)
Advocates: Natalie Suri for Gharibian; John Edson and Matthew Halgren for Wawanesa
Question:
(1) Debris from a nearby wildfire entered plaintiffs’ home and property. The wildfire debris could be cleaned by wiping the surfaces, power washing the outside, and other remedial measures. Plaintiffs’ insurance policy covered “direct physical loss to property.”
Did the superior court err in concluding that the wildfire debris was not evidence of “direct physical loss” within the meaning of plaintiffs’ policy?
Answer:
(1) No, the wildfire debris did not cause “direct physical loss” within the meaning of the policy. The superior court did not err. California law requires that a direct physical loss entail “a distinct, demonstrable, physical alteration to property. The physical alteration need not be visible to the naked eye, nor must it be structural, but it must result in some injury or impairment of the property as property.”
The California Supreme Court’s decision in Another Planet Entertainment, LLC v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 5th 1106, 1117 (2024), governs the plaintiffs’ case. In Another Planet, the California Supreme Court concluded that allegations of the presence of COVID-19 on an insured’s premises do not, without more, establish direct physical loss or damage to property within the meaning of a commercial property insurance policy.
The fact that Wawanesa made payments to the plaintiffs even though there was no coverage is irrelevant to resolving the case.
Facts:
The plaintiffs obtained a Wawanesa homeowner insurance policy that insured against “direct physical loss to property.” One month later, the Saddle Ridge wildfire began within a mile of plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs’ property was not burned, but the debris entered their home and fell outside their home and into their swimming pool.
The plaintiffs and Wawanesa hired professionals to determine the cost of cleaning the plaintiffs’ house. Wawanesa hired PuroClean, which estimated $20,718.09 for cleaning. PuroClean was willing to perform the quoted services at the estimated cost, but the plaintiffs did not hire PuroClean. Plaintiffs’ professionals estimated $35,553.10 to clean and remediate.
Plaintiffs sued Wawanesa, alleging claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Wawanesa moved for summary judgment against the plaintiffs, arguing that there was no evidence of a physical loss that fell within the scope of the policy’s coverage. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Wawanesa.
Outcome:
The Second District Court of Appeal, Division Two affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to Wawanesa.
Justice Ashmann-Gerst authored the opinion, joined by Justices Lui and Chavez.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 426092
Rachel Hudgins and Scott DeVries, Where There’s Smoke, Is There Coverage? A Closer Look at Bottega, LLC v. National Surety and Gharibian v. Wawanesa. Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog. February 13, 2025.
Case: I.C. v. Compton Unified School District - 2DCA affirms trial win for teacher in student-altercation suit
Decided: 2/6/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s judgment and order denying plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
Plaintiff-appellant: I.C.
Defendants-respondents: Compton Unified School District, et al.
Second District Court of Appeal, Division Eight case no.: B322148
Appeal from: Los Angeles Superior Court (Long, J.)
Advocates: Rosa Hirji and Alexander Rodriguez for I.C.; Terence Gallagher and Leslie Burnet for Compton Unified
Question:
(1) In a negligence case, did the superior court err by refusing to give six plaintiff-requested jury instructions relating to the special relationship between school personnel and students?
Answer:
(1) No, the superior court did not err by refusing to give the instructions. The school’s duty to prevent harm to the plaintiff was never disputed, so there was no need to instruct the jury on the “special relationship.” The standard of care is reasonableness under the circumstances. Even if the trial court erred, the plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden to show a miscarriage of justice.
Outcome:
The Second District Court of Appeal, Division Eight affirmed the superior court’s judgment and order denying plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and alternatively for a new trial.
Justice Grimes authored the opinion, joined by Justices Stratton and Viramontes.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 414242
Case: Hay v. Marinkovich - 4DCA holds that statute prohibiting unauthorized use of computers for improper purpose allows an award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants, limits availability of fees
Decided: 2/6/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the San Diego Superior Court’s order granting defendant’s costs but denying defendant’s request for attorney fees
Plaintiff-respondent: Emoke Hay
Defendant-appellant: David Marinkovich
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One case no.: D08561
Appeal from: San Diego Superior Court (Caietti, J.)
Advocates: Kendra Hall and Sean Sullivan for Hay; Ron Stormoen and Amber Babin for Marinkovich
Question:
(1) Does Penal Code § 502, which prohibits the unauthorized use of any computer system for an improper purpose, allow an award of attorney fees to a prevailing defendant in a civil case?
(2) Under what circumstances can a prevailing defendant recover attorney fees under Penal Code § 502?
Answer:
(1) Yes, a prevailing defendant in a Penal Code § 502 civil case can recover attorney fees.
(2) A prevailing defendant can recover attorney fees only where the plaintiff’s claim was “objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” The superior court in this case acted “well within its discretion” in finding that plaintiff’s claim was not frivolous or abusive.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One affirmed the superior court’s order awarding costs to Marinkovich and denying Marinkovich’s request for fees.
Justice Buchanan authored the opinion, joined by Justices Irion and Rubin.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 414655
Case: Elmi v. Related Mgmt. Co., L.P. - 4DCA clarifies that CCP § 998 does not prevent plaintiff who resolved case for less than defendant’s offer from seeking postjudgment enforcement costs and fees
Certified for Publication: 2/6/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the Orange County Superior Court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for postjudgment fees and costs
Plaintiff-appellant: Caesar Elmi
Defendant-respondent: Related Management Company, L.P.
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three case no.: G062788
Appeal from: Orange County Superior Court (Marks, J.)
Advocates: Glenn Murphy and Brendan Maloney for Elmi; Daniel Goodkin and Michael Shakouri for Related
Question:
(1) A plaintiff rejects a defendant’s settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure § 998. The case is subsequently resolved for less than the amount the defendant offered. Can the plaintiff later seek postjudgment fees and costs incurred in enforcing the judgment?
Answer:
(1) Yes, the plaintiff can still seek postjudgment enforcement fees and costs. Section 998 governs “costs allowed under Section 1031 and 1032,” which “shall be withheld or augmented as provided in this section.” Postjudgment costs and fees are not recovered under §§ 1031 and 1032, so they are unaffected by § 998(c)(1)’s provision that if “an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover his or her postoffer costs and shall pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the offer.”
Facts:
Plaintiff Elmi rejected a § 998 settlement offer from defendant Related. Elmi later settled for less than the amount Related offered. Following the entry of judgment, Elmi filed a motion for postjudgment enforcement fees and costs. The superior court denied the motion, reasoning that Elmi was not entitled to any postoffer fees or costs under § 998. Elmi appealed.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three reversed the superior court’s order denying Elmi’s motion for postjudgment fees and costs. The Fourth District Court of Appeal remanded the case to the superior court with instructions to decide whether and to what extent Elmi was entitled to recover the fees and costs that Elmi requested in his motion.
Justice Goethals authored the opinion, joined by Justices Moore and Sanchez.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 435646
Earlier decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal: Elmi v. Related Mgmt. Co., L.P., No. G061379, 2023 WL 6210756 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2023)
Case: Stubblefield v. Superior Court - 6DCA holds that superior court had jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion for release before remittitur to superior court was issued
Decided: 2/5/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Petition for writ of mandate from the superior court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for release pending the final outcome of his appeal
Petitioner: Dana Stubblefield
Respondent: Superior Court of Santa Clara County
Sixth District Court of Appeal case no.: H052893
Appeal from: Santa Clara Superior Court
Question:
(1) Does the superior court have jurisdiction over a defendant’s motion for release after the defendant prevailed in his appeal, but before the appellate court issued a remittitur to the superior court?
Answer:
(1) Yes, the superior court has jurisdiction to entertain the defendant’s motion for release in the situation described in the facts below.
The ordinary rule is that the filing of a valid notice of appeal vests jurisdiction in the appellate court until determination of the appeal and issuance of the remittitur. The notice of appeal divests the superior court of jurisdiction over matters affecting the judgment.
Under Code of Civil Procedure § 916(a), however, appellate jurisdiction does not divest the superior court of all power to act. The superior court “may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.”
Additionally, “a trial court’s jurisdiction survives where provided by statute.” Subject to exceptions not applicable in Stubblefield’s case, Penal Code §§ 1272 and 1291 confers jurisdiction on the superior court to handle a defendant’s motion for release pending appeal.
Facts:
In an appeal to the Sixth District Court of Appeal, the defendant successfully challenged his conviction on the ground that the prosecution had violated the Racial Justice Act (RJA). The Sixth District Court of Appeal declared defendant’s conviction legally invalid, vacated his sentence and conviction, and remanded the matter to the superior court to conduct new proceedings consistent with Penal Code § 745. The decision became final in the Sixth District Court of Appeal. The Attorney General petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.
Before the Sixth District Court of Appeal issued a remittitur to the superior court, Stubblefield filed a motion in the superior court seeking release pending the final outcome of his appeal. The superior court denied Stubblefield’s motion on the ground that the superior court lacked jurisdiction because no remittitur had issued.
Outcome:
The Sixth District Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the superior court to vacate its order denying Stubblefield’s motion for release and conduct proceedings to rule on the merits of the motion.
Justice Greenwood authored the opinion, joined by Justices Grover and Lie.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 400708
Central California Appellate Program: Summary
Earlier decision by the Sixth District Court of Appeal: People v. Stubblefield, 107 Cal. App. 5th 896 (2024), review filed (Feb. 4, 2025)
Case: People v. Rosemond - 5DCA rejects applying Wende-type procedures to defendant’s appeal from denial of unauthorized Penal Code § 1172.1 petition
Decided: 2/5/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s denial of a defendant-filed petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1172.1
Plaintiff-respondent: The People of the State of California
Defendant-appellant: Malcolm Rosemond
Fifth District Court of Appeal case no.: F087787
Appeal from: Fresno Superior Court (Alvarez, J.)
Advocates: Larenda Delaini for Rosemond
Question:
(1) Whether the procedure provided for in Wende/Anders—requiring an appellate court to conduct a review of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief on direct appeal that raises no specific issues—applies to a defendant’s appeal from the denial of an unauthorized defendant-filed petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1172.1?
Answer:
(1) No. Wende-type procedures do not apply. The procedures set forth in People v. Delgadillo, 14 Cal. 5th 216 (2022) are sufficient. As in Delgadillo, the defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel because this is a state postconviction proceeding. Due process principles do not require application of a Wende-type procedure in this context, as the defendant has no statutory right to file a petition for relief under Penal Code § 1172.1.
Under Delgadillo, defense counsel files a brief that includes a concise recitation of the facts and counsel’s finding that there were no arguable issues. The court sends, with a copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief. The court advises the defendant that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter.
The Delgadillo procedures were complied with in this case, and the defendant failed to submit a letter brief within 30 days. The proper resolution is to dismiss the appeal as abandoned.
Facts:
In 2011, a jury convicted defendant Rosemond of count 1, shooting at an occupied motor vehicle in violation of Penal Code § 246, and six counts of assault with a firearm. The jury found true several firearm-related allegations. The court sentenced Rosemond to an upper term of 7 years for count 1 plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the § 12022.53(d) enhancement for discharging a firearm which proximately caused great bodily injury or death to two victims.
In January 2024, Rosemond filed a “Request for Recall of Sentence and Resentencing Pursuant to Assembly Bill 600 and Penal Code Section 1172.1.” Rosemond checked a box that stated, “I hereby request appointment of counsel.”
In February 2024, the superior court issued a written order denying Rosemond’s request for recall and resentencing under § 1172.1. The superior court denied Rosemond’s request on the ground that a defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under § 1172.1.
Rosemond appealed. Rosemond’s appointed counsel filed a no-issues brief. The court of appeal notified Rosemond that, under Delgadillo, the appeal could be dismissed as abandoned if Rosemond failed to submit a letter brief within 30 days. Rosemond did not file a letter brief within 30 days.
Outcome:
The Fifth District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.
Justice Peña authored the opinion, joined by Justices Hill and Detjen.
Case: Vo v. Technology Credit Union - 6DCA reverses order denying motion to compel arbitration; arbitration agreement provided arbitrator with authority to permit nonparty discovery
Decided: 2/4/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order denying defendant’s motion to compel arbitration
Plaintiff-respondent: Thomas Vo
Defendant-appellant: Technology Credit Union
Sixth District Court of Appeal case no.: H051619
Appeal from: Santa Clara Superior Court (Chung, J.)
Advocates: Robert King for Vo; Jonathan Cohen, Robyn Callahan, and Chancellor Tseng for Technology Credit Union
Questions:
(1) The JAMS rules incorporated into an arbitration agreement allowed both parties to take one deposition of the opposing party or individual under the opposing party’s control, without the arbitrator’s approval. The rules also gave the arbitrator the authority to expand discovery. But if a third party refused to comply with the arbitrator’s discovery order, the incorporated JAMS rules would not give the arbitrator the authority to enforce compliance with the order. Is such an arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable?
(2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s request for judicial notice of JAMS rules that were not in effect when the parties signed their arbitration agreement in 2020?
Answers:
(1) No. In Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc., 52 Cal. App. 5th 360 (2020), a different panel of the Sixth District Court of Appeal held that an arbitrator could not compel prehearing third-party discovery when the arbitration agreement failed to explicitly authorize discovery from nonparties or failed to incorporate the statutes then in effect that authorized prehearing discovery. While Aixtron involved the same JAM rules effective July 1, 2014, as those in Vo’s case, the Aixtron Court did not consider whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Aixtron simply considered the arbitrator’s authority to order and compel discovery from a nonparty where that nonparty objected to the arbitrator’s order.
The July 2014 JAMS rules do provide the arbitrator with authority to make available additional nonparty discovery if necessary to allow fair arbitration of the claim. While, under Aixtron and the July 2014 JAMS rules, a third party might refuse to comply with the arbitrator’s discovery order, the court reviews “an arbitration agreement for unconscionability at the time of formation.” “The possibility of a recalcitrant third party witness does not preclude a holding that the discovery available under the provision is adequate and the agreement valid.”
(2) No. The trial court reasonably denied the defendant’s request to take judicial notice of irrelevant JAMS rules and procedures that postdated the parties’ arbitration agreement. However, the court of appeal took judicial notice of the relevant JAMS rules on its own motion. The relevant JAMS rules were “not reasonably subject to dispute and can be immediately and accurately determined by resorting to the JAMS rules archival website.”
Facts:
Plaintiff Thomas Vo signed an employment arbitration agreement with defendant Technology Credit Union (TCU), requiring both parties to arbitrate disputes related to Vo’s employment, including claims for discrimination, harassment, and wrongful termination. The agreement specified that a neutral JAMS arbitrator would oversee arbitration per JAMS rules, which were not attached.
Vo contracted COVID-19 and developed long-term health issues. TCU eventually terminated Vo. Vo sued TCU, alleging multiple violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and wrongful termination.
TCU moved to compel arbitration. Vo opposed TCU’s motion, arguing the agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Vo contended it was an adhesion contract and lacked an express provision incorporating the California Arbitration Act’s third-party discovery rights. TCU countered that the agreement allowed sufficient discovery through JAMS rules, though TCU only requested judicial notice of those rules in its reply brief, which the trial court rejected.
The trial court denied TCU’s motion to compel arbitration. The trial court found the agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court determined the agreement was an adhesion contract. In “a close factual and legal call,” the trial court concluded that the agreement did not grant the arbitrator the authority to compel third-party discovery, relying on precedent from Aixtron. The trial court determined that this limitation improperly prevented Vo from obtaining the third-party discovery necessary to arbitrate his case. TCU timely appealed from the order denying TCU’s motion to compel.
Outcome:
The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the superior court’s order denying TCU’s motion to compel arbitration, and directed the superior court to enter a new order granting TCU’s motion and staying the litigation under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4.
Justice Greenwood authored the opinion, joined by Justices Grover and Danner.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 384496
Case: People v. Chatman - 5DCA holds that a defendant’s unauthorized petition for resentencing does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction to resentence the defendant
Decided: 2/4/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order denying a defendant-filed petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1172.1
Plaintiff-respondent: The People of the State of California
Defendant-appellant: Demidrick Chatman
Fifth District Court of Appeal case no.: F087868
Appeal from: Tulare Superior Court (Leedy, J.)
Advocates: Amanda D. Cary for the People; Richard Fitzer for Chatman
Questions:
(1) Whether a criminal defendant’s filing of an unauthorized petition for relief under Penal Code § 1172.1 deprives the superior court of jurisdiction to resentence the defendant otherwise afforded to the court by § 1172.1.
(2) Whether an order denying a defendant’s unauthorized request to recall his sentence under § 1172.1 is appealable.
Answers:
(1) No. A defendant’s filing of an unauthorized petition under § 1172.1 does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction to resentence the defendant. Section 1172.1 provides the superior court with jurisdiction and discretion to recall and resentence the defendant on its motion.
(2) Yes. Though the superior court is not required to rule on a defendant’s request for relief under § 1172.1, when a trial court affirmatively denies a petition, it has effectively ruled on the petition. In doing so, the court’s ruling qualifies as an appealable order when it affects a person’s substantial rights. An order denying a defendant’s request for relief under § 1172.1 affects the defendant’s substantial rights.
Facts:
In 2017, the defendant pleaded no contest to multiple charges, including attempted second-degree robbery, assault with a firearm, and misdemeanor offenses. He also admitted to firearm enhancements and a prior serious felony strike. As a result, he was sentenced to 27 years and 8 months in prison. The court imposed restitution and other fines.
In 2023, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code § 1172.6. The court denied the petition on the ground that the defendant failed to state a prima facie case for eligibility because the defendant did not allege, nor did the record show, that the defendant was convicted of or charged with murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter.
In 2024, the defendant filed a “request for recall of sentence and resentencing under Assembly Bill 600 and Penal Code section 1172.1” using a prepared form. The defendant argued that changes in sentencing laws made him eligible for reconsideration. The court denied the defendant’s request and stated that it lacked jurisdiction to resentence the defendant. When the defendant submitted an identical request on March 21, 2024, the court denied the request without further explanation.
Outcome:
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the superior court’s order denying defendant’s § 1172.1 petition for resentencing, and remanded for further proceedings.
Justice Peña authored the opinion, joined by Justices Hill and Smith.
District Split:
5DCA: An order denying a defendant’s unauthorized request to recall his sentence under § 1172.1 is appealable.
2DCA: An order denying a defendant’s unauthorized request to recall his sentence under § 1172.1 is not appealable.
In People v. Hodge, 107 Cal. App. 5th 985, 328 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623 (2024), the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 2, held that a superior court’s decision denying a defendant’s postjudgment request for resentencing was an “order” under Penal Code § 1237. In this respect, Hodge and Chatman are in agreement.
However, the Hodge Court also held that “a trial court’s order declining to exercise its discretion under section 1172.1 to recall a defendant’s sentence on its own motion after receiving the defendant’s unauthorized request for such relief does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b).” Hodge, 328 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 631.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 384047