Case: People v. Superior Court (Valdez) - 4DCA denies resentencing relief to defendant who was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence he received at Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) resentencing
Decided: 2/10/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Petition for writ of mandate from the superior court’s order granting a Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) petition for resentencing
Petitioner: The People of the State of California
Respondent: The Superior Court of Riverside County
Real Party in Interest: Mariano Valdez
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two case no.: E084222
Petition from an order by: Riverside Superior Court (Molloy, J.)
Advocates: Michael Hestrin and W. Matthew Murray for the People; Steven Harmon, William Meronek, and Nicholas Kross for Valdez
Question:
(1) Under Penal Code § 1170(d)(1), a defendant who (i) was under 18 years old when he committed his offense, (ii) was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), and (iii) has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, may petition the sentencing court for the recall of his sentence and resentencing.
Under Penal Code § 1170(d)(10), if the defendant is resentenced to LWOP, “the defendant may submit another petition for recall and resentencing to the sentencing court when the defendant has been committed to the custody of the department for at least 20 years.”
In People v. Heard, 83 Cal. App. 5th 608, 632 (2022), the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One found that there was “no legitimate reason for making juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit life without parole terms eligible to seek resentencing but not juvenile offenders sentenced to the equivalent of a life without parole sentence.” The Heard Court held that denying a juvenile offender the opportunity to seek resentencing—when that offender was sentenced to 23 years plus 80 years to life, the functional equivalent of LWOP—violated the juvenile offender’s right to equal protection of the laws.
In this case, the defendant was initially sentenced to LWOP. The defendant was later resentenced under § 1170(d)(1) to 50 years to life. The defendant was resentenced after Penal Code § 3051 was enacted, meaning the defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence included the availability of youth offender parole.
Was the defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence, combined with the availability of youth offender parole, the functional equivalent of LWOP—entitling the defendant to file a successive resentencing petition under § 1170(d)(10)?
Answer:
(1) No, defendant Valdez’s 50-year-to-life sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP in light of his eligibility to seek youth offender parole. Valdez was not eligible to seek resentencing under § 1170(d)(10).
Under People v. Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th 261, 279 (2016), “a life sentence with parole eligibility during” the defendant’s “25th year of incarceration” is not “the functional equivalent of LWOP.” Valdez was resentenced to a life sentence with parole eligibility during his 25th year of incarceration. Valdez was not resentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP.
Facts:
In 2000, a jury convicted Valdez of first-degree murder for a killing committed when Valdez was 17 years old. The jury found true a hate-crime special circumstance and a firearm enhancement. The superior court found true a gang enhancement. The superior court sentenced Valdez to 25 years to life plus LWOP.
In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170(d)(2) [now § 1170(d)(1)]. The superior court granted Valdez’s petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life.
In November 2022, Valdez became eligible for youth offender parole under Penal Code § 3051. Valdez received a parole hearing in December 2023. Parole was denied.
In October 2023, Valdez filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) and Heard. Valdez argued that he was entitled to resentencing under Heard because his sentence of 50 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP.
The superior court deemed Valdez’s petition a successive petition under Penal Code § 1170(d)(10) and granted Valdez’s petition. The superior court reasoned that Valdez’s 50-years-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that to deny Valdez the opportunity to seek resentencing would result in an equal-protection violation under Heard.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two granted the People’s petition for writ of mandate. The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to (1) vacate its order granting Valdez resentencing relief and (2) enter a new and different order denying the petition for resentencing.
Justice Menetrez authored the opinion, joined by Justices Ramirez and McKinster.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 441763
Case: People v. Gonzalez - 4DCA holds that a remand for recalculation of presentencing credits does not entitle a defendant to a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code § 1170
Decided: 2/7/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order recalculating presentencing credits and denying the defendant’s request for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170
Plaintiff-respondent: The People of the State of California
Defendant-appellant: Jesse Gonzalez, Jr.
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One case no.: D082662
Appeal from: Imperial Superior Court (Plourd, J.)
Advocates: Laura Vavakin for Gonzalez; Steven Oetting for the People
Question:
(1) Does an appellate court’s remand for recalculation of presentencing credits constitute a new pronouncement of judgment and entitle a defendant to a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code § 1170?
Answer:
(1) No. The proper approach is to correct the credit count without vacating the convictions or associated sentences. “Because it is only after a sentence is vacated that the judgment becomes nonfinal and subject to the resentencing considerations, we further conclude a full resentencing is not appropriate under these circumstances.” (Citation omitted.)
Facts:
In 2012, a jury convicted Gonzalez of attempted deliberate premeditated murder and assault with a deadly weapon, with enhancements for inflicting great bodily injury. The superior court sentenced Gonzalez to an aggregate term of 17 years to life, with the possibility of parole, and gave Gonzalez credit for 700 days served.
A month later, the superior court recalled Gonzalez’s sentence under Penal Code § 1170(d). The superior court resentenced Gonzalez without specifying whether the sentence included the possibility of parole and without changing the credit calculation.
On Gonzalez’s direct appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal ordered corrections to the abstract of judgment to reflect that Gonzalez’s sentence was life in prison with the possibility of parole plus six years for the enhancements.
In 2022, Gonzalez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his sentence was not corrected and his credits were incorrectly calculated. The superior court summarily denied Gonzalez’s petition.
Gonzalez filed a habeas petition in the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted Gonzalez’s petition in part and remanded for recalculation of Gonzalez’s custody credits.
On remand, the superior court ordered the abstract of judgment amended to reflect credit for 759 days. Gonzalez appealed. Gonzalez’s appellate counsel notified the superior court of an error in the revised calculation. The superior court again amended the abstract, this time to reflect credit for 771 days.
Gonzalez’s appellate counsel filed a Wende brief. Gonzalez filed a supplemental brief. The Fourth District Court of Appeal ordered briefing on the question presented above.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One affirmed the superior court’s order denying Gonzalez’s request for a full resentencing.
Justice Huffman authored the opinion, joined by Justices Kelety and Castillo.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 428446
Case: People v. Chatman - 5DCA holds that a defendant’s unauthorized petition for resentencing does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction to resentence the defendant
Decided: 2/4/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order denying a defendant-filed petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1172.1
Plaintiff-respondent: The People of the State of California
Defendant-appellant: Demidrick Chatman
Fifth District Court of Appeal case no.: F087868
Appeal from: Tulare Superior Court (Leedy, J.)
Advocates: Amanda D. Cary for the People; Richard Fitzer for Chatman
Questions:
(1) Whether a criminal defendant’s filing of an unauthorized petition for relief under Penal Code § 1172.1 deprives the superior court of jurisdiction to resentence the defendant otherwise afforded to the court by § 1172.1.
(2) Whether an order denying a defendant’s unauthorized request to recall his sentence under § 1172.1 is appealable.
Answers:
(1) No. A defendant’s filing of an unauthorized petition under § 1172.1 does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction to resentence the defendant. Section 1172.1 provides the superior court with jurisdiction and discretion to recall and resentence the defendant on its motion.
(2) Yes. Though the superior court is not required to rule on a defendant’s request for relief under § 1172.1, when a trial court affirmatively denies a petition, it has effectively ruled on the petition. In doing so, the court’s ruling qualifies as an appealable order when it affects a person’s substantial rights. An order denying a defendant’s request for relief under § 1172.1 affects the defendant’s substantial rights.
Facts:
In 2017, the defendant pleaded no contest to multiple charges, including attempted second-degree robbery, assault with a firearm, and misdemeanor offenses. He also admitted to firearm enhancements and a prior serious felony strike. As a result, he was sentenced to 27 years and 8 months in prison. The court imposed restitution and other fines.
In 2023, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code § 1172.6. The court denied the petition on the ground that the defendant failed to state a prima facie case for eligibility because the defendant did not allege, nor did the record show, that the defendant was convicted of or charged with murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter.
In 2024, the defendant filed a “request for recall of sentence and resentencing under Assembly Bill 600 and Penal Code section 1172.1” using a prepared form. The defendant argued that changes in sentencing laws made him eligible for reconsideration. The court denied the defendant’s request and stated that it lacked jurisdiction to resentence the defendant. When the defendant submitted an identical request on March 21, 2024, the court denied the request without further explanation.
Outcome:
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the superior court’s order denying defendant’s § 1172.1 petition for resentencing, and remanded for further proceedings.
Justice Peña authored the opinion, joined by Justices Hill and Smith.
District Split:
5DCA: An order denying a defendant’s unauthorized request to recall his sentence under § 1172.1 is appealable.
2DCA: An order denying a defendant’s unauthorized request to recall his sentence under § 1172.1 is not appealable.
In People v. Hodge, 107 Cal. App. 5th 985, 328 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623 (2024), the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 2, held that a superior court’s decision denying a defendant’s postjudgment request for resentencing was an “order” under Penal Code § 1237. In this respect, Hodge and Chatman are in agreement.
However, the Hodge Court also held that “a trial court’s order declining to exercise its discretion under section 1172.1 to recall a defendant’s sentence on its own motion after receiving the defendant’s unauthorized request for such relief does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b).” Hodge, 328 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 631.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 384047