Case: I.C. v. Compton Unified School District - 2DCA affirms trial win for teacher in student-altercation suit
Decided: 2/6/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s judgment and order denying plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
Plaintiff-appellant: I.C.
Defendants-respondents: Compton Unified School District, et al.
Second District Court of Appeal, Division Eight case no.: B322148
Appeal from: Los Angeles Superior Court (Long, J.)
Advocates: Rosa Hirji and Alexander Rodriguez for I.C.; Terence Gallagher and Leslie Burnet for Compton Unified
Question:
(1) In a negligence case, did the superior court err by refusing to give six plaintiff-requested jury instructions relating to the special relationship between school personnel and students?
Answer:
(1) No, the superior court did not err by refusing to give the instructions. The school’s duty to prevent harm to the plaintiff was never disputed, so there was no need to instruct the jury on the “special relationship.” The standard of care is reasonableness under the circumstances. Even if the trial court erred, the plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden to show a miscarriage of justice.
Outcome:
The Second District Court of Appeal, Division Eight affirmed the superior court’s judgment and order denying plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and alternatively for a new trial.
Justice Grimes authored the opinion, joined by Justices Stratton and Viramontes.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 414242
Case: Elmi v. Related Mgmt. Co., L.P. - 4DCA clarifies that CCP § 998 does not prevent plaintiff who resolved case for less than defendant’s offer from seeking postjudgment enforcement costs and fees
Certified for Publication: 2/6/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the Orange County Superior Court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for postjudgment fees and costs
Plaintiff-appellant: Caesar Elmi
Defendant-respondent: Related Management Company, L.P.
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three case no.: G062788
Appeal from: Orange County Superior Court (Marks, J.)
Advocates: Glenn Murphy and Brendan Maloney for Elmi; Daniel Goodkin and Michael Shakouri for Related
Question:
(1) A plaintiff rejects a defendant’s settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure § 998. The case is subsequently resolved for less than the amount the defendant offered. Can the plaintiff later seek postjudgment fees and costs incurred in enforcing the judgment?
Answer:
(1) Yes, the plaintiff can still seek postjudgment enforcement fees and costs. Section 998 governs “costs allowed under Section 1031 and 1032,” which “shall be withheld or augmented as provided in this section.” Postjudgment costs and fees are not recovered under §§ 1031 and 1032, so they are unaffected by § 998(c)(1)’s provision that if “an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover his or her postoffer costs and shall pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the offer.”
Facts:
Plaintiff Elmi rejected a § 998 settlement offer from defendant Related. Elmi later settled for less than the amount Related offered. Following the entry of judgment, Elmi filed a motion for postjudgment enforcement fees and costs. The superior court denied the motion, reasoning that Elmi was not entitled to any postoffer fees or costs under § 998. Elmi appealed.
Outcome:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three reversed the superior court’s order denying Elmi’s motion for postjudgment fees and costs. The Fourth District Court of Appeal remanded the case to the superior court with instructions to decide whether and to what extent Elmi was entitled to recover the fees and costs that Elmi requested in his motion.
Justice Goethals authored the opinion, joined by Justices Moore and Sanchez.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 435646
Earlier decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal: Elmi v. Related Mgmt. Co., L.P., No. G061379, 2023 WL 6210756 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2023)
Case: Stubblefield v. Superior Court - 6DCA holds that superior court had jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion for release before remittitur to superior court was issued
Decided: 2/5/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Petition for writ of mandate from the superior court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for release pending the final outcome of his appeal
Petitioner: Dana Stubblefield
Respondent: Superior Court of Santa Clara County
Sixth District Court of Appeal case no.: H052893
Appeal from: Santa Clara Superior Court
Question:
(1) Does the superior court have jurisdiction over a defendant’s motion for release after the defendant prevailed in his appeal, but before the appellate court issued a remittitur to the superior court?
Answer:
(1) Yes, the superior court has jurisdiction to entertain the defendant’s motion for release in the situation described in the facts below.
The ordinary rule is that the filing of a valid notice of appeal vests jurisdiction in the appellate court until determination of the appeal and issuance of the remittitur. The notice of appeal divests the superior court of jurisdiction over matters affecting the judgment.
Under Code of Civil Procedure § 916(a), however, appellate jurisdiction does not divest the superior court of all power to act. The superior court “may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.”
Additionally, “a trial court’s jurisdiction survives where provided by statute.” Subject to exceptions not applicable in Stubblefield’s case, Penal Code §§ 1272 and 1291 confers jurisdiction on the superior court to handle a defendant’s motion for release pending appeal.
Facts:
In an appeal to the Sixth District Court of Appeal, the defendant successfully challenged his conviction on the ground that the prosecution had violated the Racial Justice Act (RJA). The Sixth District Court of Appeal declared defendant’s conviction legally invalid, vacated his sentence and conviction, and remanded the matter to the superior court to conduct new proceedings consistent with Penal Code § 745. The decision became final in the Sixth District Court of Appeal. The Attorney General petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.
Before the Sixth District Court of Appeal issued a remittitur to the superior court, Stubblefield filed a motion in the superior court seeking release pending the final outcome of his appeal. The superior court denied Stubblefield’s motion on the ground that the superior court lacked jurisdiction because no remittitur had issued.
Outcome:
The Sixth District Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the superior court to vacate its order denying Stubblefield’s motion for release and conduct proceedings to rule on the merits of the motion.
Justice Greenwood authored the opinion, joined by Justices Grover and Lie.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 400708
Central California Appellate Program: Summary
Earlier decision by the Sixth District Court of Appeal: People v. Stubblefield, 107 Cal. App. 5th 896 (2024), review filed (Feb. 4, 2025)
Case: People v. Rosemond - 5DCA rejects applying Wende-type procedures to defendant’s appeal from denial of unauthorized Penal Code § 1172.1 petition
Decided: 2/5/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s denial of a defendant-filed petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1172.1
Plaintiff-respondent: The People of the State of California
Defendant-appellant: Malcolm Rosemond
Fifth District Court of Appeal case no.: F087787
Appeal from: Fresno Superior Court (Alvarez, J.)
Advocates: Larenda Delaini for Rosemond
Question:
(1) Whether the procedure provided for in Wende/Anders—requiring an appellate court to conduct a review of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief on direct appeal that raises no specific issues—applies to a defendant’s appeal from the denial of an unauthorized defendant-filed petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1172.1?
Answer:
(1) No. Wende-type procedures do not apply. The procedures set forth in People v. Delgadillo, 14 Cal. 5th 216 (2022) are sufficient. As in Delgadillo, the defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel because this is a state postconviction proceeding. Due process principles do not require application of a Wende-type procedure in this context, as the defendant has no statutory right to file a petition for relief under Penal Code § 1172.1.
Under Delgadillo, defense counsel files a brief that includes a concise recitation of the facts and counsel’s finding that there were no arguable issues. The court sends, with a copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief. The court advises the defendant that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter.
The Delgadillo procedures were complied with in this case, and the defendant failed to submit a letter brief within 30 days. The proper resolution is to dismiss the appeal as abandoned.
Facts:
In 2011, a jury convicted defendant Rosemond of count 1, shooting at an occupied motor vehicle in violation of Penal Code § 246, and six counts of assault with a firearm. The jury found true several firearm-related allegations. The court sentenced Rosemond to an upper term of 7 years for count 1 plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the § 12022.53(d) enhancement for discharging a firearm which proximately caused great bodily injury or death to two victims.
In January 2024, Rosemond filed a “Request for Recall of Sentence and Resentencing Pursuant to Assembly Bill 600 and Penal Code Section 1172.1.” Rosemond checked a box that stated, “I hereby request appointment of counsel.”
In February 2024, the superior court issued a written order denying Rosemond’s request for recall and resentencing under § 1172.1. The superior court denied Rosemond’s request on the ground that a defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under § 1172.1.
Rosemond appealed. Rosemond’s appointed counsel filed a no-issues brief. The court of appeal notified Rosemond that, under Delgadillo, the appeal could be dismissed as abandoned if Rosemond failed to submit a letter brief within 30 days. Rosemond did not file a letter brief within 30 days.
Outcome:
The Fifth District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.
Justice Peña authored the opinion, joined by Justices Hill and Detjen.
Case: Vo v. Technology Credit Union - 6DCA reverses order denying motion to compel arbitration; arbitration agreement provided arbitrator with authority to permit nonparty discovery
Decided: 2/4/2025
Docket
Case Overview:
Procedural posture: Appeal from the superior court’s order denying defendant’s motion to compel arbitration
Plaintiff-respondent: Thomas Vo
Defendant-appellant: Technology Credit Union
Sixth District Court of Appeal case no.: H051619
Appeal from: Santa Clara Superior Court (Chung, J.)
Advocates: Robert King for Vo; Jonathan Cohen, Robyn Callahan, and Chancellor Tseng for Technology Credit Union
Questions:
(1) The JAMS rules incorporated into an arbitration agreement allowed both parties to take one deposition of the opposing party or individual under the opposing party’s control, without the arbitrator’s approval. The rules also gave the arbitrator the authority to expand discovery. But if a third party refused to comply with the arbitrator’s discovery order, the incorporated JAMS rules would not give the arbitrator the authority to enforce compliance with the order. Is such an arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable?
(2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s request for judicial notice of JAMS rules that were not in effect when the parties signed their arbitration agreement in 2020?
Answers:
(1) No. In Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc., 52 Cal. App. 5th 360 (2020), a different panel of the Sixth District Court of Appeal held that an arbitrator could not compel prehearing third-party discovery when the arbitration agreement failed to explicitly authorize discovery from nonparties or failed to incorporate the statutes then in effect that authorized prehearing discovery. While Aixtron involved the same JAM rules effective July 1, 2014, as those in Vo’s case, the Aixtron Court did not consider whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Aixtron simply considered the arbitrator’s authority to order and compel discovery from a nonparty where that nonparty objected to the arbitrator’s order.
The July 2014 JAMS rules do provide the arbitrator with authority to make available additional nonparty discovery if necessary to allow fair arbitration of the claim. While, under Aixtron and the July 2014 JAMS rules, a third party might refuse to comply with the arbitrator’s discovery order, the court reviews “an arbitration agreement for unconscionability at the time of formation.” “The possibility of a recalcitrant third party witness does not preclude a holding that the discovery available under the provision is adequate and the agreement valid.”
(2) No. The trial court reasonably denied the defendant’s request to take judicial notice of irrelevant JAMS rules and procedures that postdated the parties’ arbitration agreement. However, the court of appeal took judicial notice of the relevant JAMS rules on its own motion. The relevant JAMS rules were “not reasonably subject to dispute and can be immediately and accurately determined by resorting to the JAMS rules archival website.”
Facts:
Plaintiff Thomas Vo signed an employment arbitration agreement with defendant Technology Credit Union (TCU), requiring both parties to arbitrate disputes related to Vo’s employment, including claims for discrimination, harassment, and wrongful termination. The agreement specified that a neutral JAMS arbitrator would oversee arbitration per JAMS rules, which were not attached.
Vo contracted COVID-19 and developed long-term health issues. TCU eventually terminated Vo. Vo sued TCU, alleging multiple violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and wrongful termination.
TCU moved to compel arbitration. Vo opposed TCU’s motion, arguing the agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Vo contended it was an adhesion contract and lacked an express provision incorporating the California Arbitration Act’s third-party discovery rights. TCU countered that the agreement allowed sufficient discovery through JAMS rules, though TCU only requested judicial notice of those rules in its reply brief, which the trial court rejected.
The trial court denied TCU’s motion to compel arbitration. The trial court found the agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court determined the agreement was an adhesion contract. In “a close factual and legal call,” the trial court concluded that the agreement did not grant the arbitrator the authority to compel third-party discovery, relying on precedent from Aixtron. The trial court determined that this limitation improperly prevented Vo from obtaining the third-party discovery necessary to arbitrate his case. TCU timely appealed from the order denying TCU’s motion to compel.
Outcome:
The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the superior court’s order denying TCU’s motion to compel arbitration, and directed the superior court to enter a new order granting TCU’s motion and staying the litigation under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4.
Justice Greenwood authored the opinion, joined by Justices Grover and Danner.
Links:
Westlaw: 2025 WL 384496