Case: People v. Superior Court (Valdez) - 4DCA denies resentencing relief to defendant who was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence he received at Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) resentencing

Decided: 2/10/2025

Docket

Case Overview:

Procedural posture: Petition for writ of mandate from the superior court’s order granting a Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) petition for resentencing

Petitioner: The People of the State of California

Respondent: The Superior Court of Riverside County

Real Party in Interest: Mariano Valdez

Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two case no.: E084222

Petition from an order by: Riverside Superior Court (Molloy, J.)

Advocates: Michael Hestrin and W. Matthew Murray for the People; Steven Harmon, William Meronek, and Nicholas Kross for Valdez

Question:

(1) Under Penal Code § 1170(d)(1), a defendant who (i) was under 18 years old when he committed his offense, (ii) was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), and (iii) has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, may petition the sentencing court for the recall of his sentence and resentencing.

Under Penal Code § 1170(d)(10), if the defendant is resentenced to LWOP, “the defendant may submit another petition for recall and resentencing to the sentencing court when the defendant has been committed to the custody of the department for at least 20 years.”

In People v. Heard, 83 Cal. App. 5th 608, 632 (2022), the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One found that there was “no legitimate reason for making juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit life without parole terms eligible to seek resentencing but not juvenile offenders sentenced to the equivalent of a life without parole sentence.” The Heard Court held that denying a juvenile offender the opportunity to seek resentencing—when that offender was sentenced to 23 years plus 80 years to life, the functional equivalent of LWOP—violated the juvenile offender’s right to equal protection of the laws.

In this case, the defendant was initially sentenced to LWOP. The defendant was later resentenced under § 1170(d)(1) to 50 years to life. The defendant was resentenced after Penal Code § 3051 was enacted, meaning the defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence included the availability of youth offender parole.

Was the defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence, combined with the availability of youth offender parole, the functional equivalent of LWOP—entitling the defendant to file a successive resentencing petition under § 1170(d)(10)?

Answer:

(1) No, defendant Valdez’s 50-year-to-life sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP in light of his eligibility to seek youth offender parole. Valdez was not eligible to seek resentencing under § 1170(d)(10).

Under People v. Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th 261, 279 (2016), “a life sentence with parole eligibility during” the defendant’s “25th year of incarceration” is not “the functional equivalent of LWOP.” Valdez was resentenced to a life sentence with parole eligibility during his 25th year of incarceration. Valdez was not resentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP.

Facts:

In 2000, a jury convicted Valdez of first-degree murder for a killing committed when Valdez was 17 years old. The jury found true a hate-crime special circumstance and a firearm enhancement. The superior court found true a gang enhancement. The superior court sentenced Valdez to 25 years to life plus LWOP.

In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170(d)(2) [now § 1170(d)(1)]. The superior court granted Valdez’s petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life.

In November 2022, Valdez became eligible for youth offender parole under Penal Code § 3051. Valdez received a parole hearing in December 2023. Parole was denied.

In October 2023, Valdez filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) and Heard. Valdez argued that he was entitled to resentencing under Heard because his sentence of 50 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP.

The superior court deemed Valdez’s petition a successive petition under Penal Code § 1170(d)(10) and granted Valdez’s petition. The superior court reasoned that Valdez’s 50-years-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that to deny Valdez the opportunity to seek resentencing would result in an equal-protection violation under Heard.

Outcome:

The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two granted the People’s petition for writ of mandate. The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to (1) vacate its order granting Valdez resentencing relief and (2) enter a new and different order denying the petition for resentencing.

Justice Menetrez authored the opinion, joined by Justices Ramirez and McKinster.

Links:

Westlaw: 2025 WL 441763